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CASE NOTES
court in this case deemed the insured's will a "reasonable effort" to change
the beneficiary.26
Nevertheless, there is question as to whether this case is a good prece-
dent for permitting a change of beneficiary by will. The defendant did
not claim as a designated beneficiary, but rather as the person entitled to
take the policy proceeds in the absence of a designated beneficiary. Thus
an important factor was that the will did not truly change the beneficiary,
but rather that it designated one for the first time. Also, the decision of
the case was almost immediately rejected by another court.27
Many federal decisions recognize that the manifested intent of the in-
sured is the determining consideration. Besides being one of the basic legal
arguments to permit change of beneficiary by will, it also is a moral factor
which the court must consider. One often quoted Arkansas decision de-
clares that ". . . this being the insured's last expression on the subject, it
ought to control. '28 In answer, it was said that where no steps are taken
to comply with the policy provisions, the expressed purpose is an un-
executed intention and accomplishes nothing.2 9 Nevertheless, the insured
keeps the policy in force and pays the premiums, and his last wish should
be respected30 Furthermore, an expression of intention documented in a
will is much more convincing than any informal writing would be.3 '
These arguments between strict construction on the one hand and the
insured's intention on the other are still highly controverted. Whether the
courts are finally learning to support the intention is something to be de-
termined at a future date.
26 Sears v. Austin, 180 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
27 See Breckline v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 40 Pa. 573, 178 A. 2d 748 (1962). (Held:
The policy provisions were statutory and could not be waived). Note that if subsequent
decisions show that the rules applicable to Federal Employee's Life Insurance, as with
National Life Insurance, are not applicable to private commercial insurance, the prece-
dent of the Sears case will be valid only within this narrow sphere of insurance created
by federal statute, if at all.
2s Pedron v. Olds, 193 Ark. 1026, 1030, 105 S.W. 2d 70, 72 (1937) (Emphasis added).
2 9 Parks' Ex'rs. v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435, 156 S.W. 2d 480 (1941).
S0 Stone v. Stephens, 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E. 2d 766 (1951), (dissenting opinion,
Zimmerman, J.).
31 Ibid. (dissenting opinion, Stewart, J.).
LABOR-EXTENSION OF THE ENTITY CONCEPT TO
ALLOW RECOVERY TO UNION MEMBERS IN
TORT ACTIONS AGAINST UNION
The defendant union, an unincorporated association, maintained a park-
ing lot adjacent to its meeting hall as an accommodation for its members.
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Marshall, a member of the union, was injured as the result of a fall over
a concrete obstruction in the lot and brought an action against the union
for injuries sustained in his fall. A motion for a summary judgment was
filed by the union which contended that Marshall's membership in the
union precluded recovery in a negligence action. Defendant's motion was
granted and the plaintiff appealed. The question which the court had to
determine was whether a member of an unincorporated association may
maintain an action against the union for personal injuries allegedly caused
by negligent maintenance of the property. On appeal, the Supreme Court
held that the member could maintain such an action. Marshall v. Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Union, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211, 371 P. 2d 987 (1962).
This question had not been previously litigated in California, but it has
been the subject of litigation in other courts. In Hromek v. Gemeinde,1
the plaintiff, a union member, tripped over a platform negligently placed
in the union meeting hall by the union officers and was injured. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff had no cause of action
for the union had neither an entity nor existence apart from that of its
members. The Court considered the union members as co-principals and
would not permit a suit allowing a co-principal to sue a co-principal.2
This line of reasoning holds that a voluntary association such as a labor
union is not a legal entity and cannot be sued as such in the absence of a
statute.8 Although it is permissible in some jurisdictions to sue a group
comprising a union in the name of the association; this has been held to be
a procedural provision and does not in any way change the status of the
group.4
The union in the noted case relied on the general rule that members of
an unincorporated association are engaged in a joint enterprise, and the
negligence of each member in the prosecution of that enterprise is im-
putable to each and every member.5 Consequently, the member who has
1238 Wis. 204, 298 N.W. 587 (1941).
2 United Mine Workers of America v. Bourland, 169 Ark. 796, 277 S.W. 546 (1925);
Diamond Block Local Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 188 Ky. 477, 222 S.W.
1079 (1920).
8 DeVillars v. Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A. 2d 333 (1950). An association member who,
while operating a steam bath, sustained injuries through the negligence of other asso-
ciation members was not able to recover from the association.
4 REviSEo CODE OF MONTANA, 93-2827 (1947). When two or more persons, associated
in any business, transact such business, under a common name, whether it comprises
the names of such persons or not, the associates may be sued by such common name.
The summons in such case being served on one or more of the associates, and the judg-
ment in the action shall bind the joint property of all the associates, in the same manner
as if all had named defendants, and had been sued upon their joint liability.
5 Hromek v. Gemeinde, 238 Wis. 204, 298 N.W. 587 (1941); Clark v. Grand Lodge
of Brhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 328 Mo. 1084, 43 S.W. 2d 404 (1931).
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suffered damages through the tortious conduct of the association may not
recover from the association. The basic rationale of the rule is that an
association has no legal entity or existence apart from that of its mem-
bers." When the members are joined in the prosecution of a joint enter-
prise, there is created a mutual relationship of agency among them with
the result that the negligence of any one of them is imputed to each and
all. 7 In legal effect, each member becomes both a principal and an agent
as to all members for the actions of the group itself. A principal may sue
an agent for dereliction of a duty but he may not sue his co-principals for
the dereliction of a duty by their common agent.8
Basically, this rule has been arrived at by applying to other forms of
voluntary unincorporated associations the rules of law developed in
partnerships.9 Probably the most accepted definition of a partnership is
the one given by Chancellor Kent:
A contract of two or more competent persons to place their money, efforts,
labor, and skill on some or all of them in lawful commerce or business and
to divide the profit and bear the loss in certain proportions.10
The term "association" does not have in law the fixed meaning accorded
to partnerships or corporations,'1 but is used to indicate a collection of
persons who have united or joined together for some special purpose or
business.' 2 It is commonly used to indicate a body of persons acting to-
gether without a charter but upon the methods and forms used by in-
corporated bodies for the prosecution of some common enterprise.la
The courts in recognition of the difference have gradually evolved new
theories in approaching the problems of such associations. Labor unions
6 Roschmann v. Sanborn, 315 Pa. 188, 172 A. 657 (1934). Members of an unincor-
porated fraternal association participated in a social excursion in a bus owned and
operated by the organization. Plaintiff was injured and brought suit but was denied
recovery because the negligence of the driver was imputed to him the same as to all
other members of the organization. Koogler v. Koogler, 127 Ohio St. 57, 186 N.E. 725
(1933).
7 DeVillars v. Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A. 2d 333 (1950); Roschmann v. Sanborn, 315
Pa. 188, 172 At. 657 (1934); Koogler v. Koogler, 127 Ohio St. 57, 186 N.E. 725 (1933).
S Hromek v. Gemeinde, 234 Wis. 204, 298 N.W. 587 (1941).
9 Pettis v. Atkins, 60 111. 454 (1871).
10 KFNT'S COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW. Kent, J. (1763-1847), an American
jurist whose four volume commentaries won for him a distinguished place amongst
jurists. His judgments as chancellor have formed much of the basis of American equity
jurisprudence.
11W. R. Roach & Co. v. Harding, 348 Ill 454, 181 N.E. 331 (1932).
12Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n v. Murphy, 389 I.. 102, 58 N.E. 2d 906( 1945);
Clark v. Grand Lodge of Brhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 328 Mo. 1084, 43 S.W. 2d 404 (1931);
People v. Brander, 244 Ill. 26,91 N.E. 59 (1910).
1S Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924).
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are treated as separate entities in the entering and performance of their
contracts, and in suits against members for dues, strike penalties, and
fines. 14 Conversely, it has been held that a member can sue his union for
a welfare fund payment due him or to recover an overpayment of dues,
for wrongful expulsion, or for breaches of the membership contract.15
The first major breakthrough in considering unions liable for their torts
is found in the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United
Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Company.16 In this instance
the striking mine workers destroyed company property and injured by-
standers. The Court reached the conclusion, although there was no statute
expressly so providing, that an unincorporated labor union was responsible
for its torts and could be sued as an entity in the federal courts. In a later
case, the United States Supreme Court ruled that members of unions are
not subject to either criminal or civil liability for the acts of the union or
its officers unless it is shown that they personally authorized or partici-
pated in the particular acts. l7
Thus, the main basis of the defendant union's contention in the instant
case was 1) that the union is not a legal entity, and 2) that each member
of the union is liable as a principal for the acts of union officers, agents,
and employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior, is not sustained
by the reasoning of the Supreme Court. The extension of the entity con-
cept of unions in federal courts and the removal of the member's personal
liability for the acts of the union has swept away the two main bases
of the rule prohibiting suits against large unincorporated voluntary
associations.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin changed from its position in the
Hromek'5 case in the later case of Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters.'9
This is apparently the first case expressly allowing a member of an un-
incorporated association to sue the association as an entity for negligence.
Fray was discharged by his employer and immediately thereafter gave
notice of his discharge to the union. The union was under a duty to reg-
ister a formal grievance but did not and Fray subsequently brought suit
against the union. The Wisconsin Supreme Court extended the entity
concept to include recovery from union funds for negligent representa-
tion and suggested that if an association has the attributes of an entity, it
should be so considered for purposes of tort liability. However, the Court
14 Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W. 2d 782 (1960).
15 Ibid. 16 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
17 U.S. v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
18 Hromek v. Gemeinde, 234 Wis. 204, 298 N.W. 587 (1941).
19 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W. 2d 782 (1960). The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
the Hromek case does not exclude all possibility of an action by an injured union mem-
ber against the union.
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limited the union entity concept for tort actions to a violation of those
duties growing out of the union-member relationship, leaving open the
question of recognition of union entity for a violation of a duty owed to
the members in common, such as negligent maintenance of a union park-
ing lot.
The California Court in the Marshall case extended the entity concept
to include all union torts. Consequently two states, California and in cer-
tain factual situations Wisconsin, allow recovery in suits by union mem-
bers against the unincorporated union. All the other states, including
Illinois, uphold the concept that voluntary unincorporated associations
may not be sued by their members.
The minority view seems to be the better reasoned holdings. Labor
unions are developing institutions and with their tremendous growth in
importance and power they have come to be more akin to large corpora-
tions than fraternal orders or partnerships. 20 These organizations, no
longer being comparable to voluntary fraternal orders or partnerships,
are sui generis and approximate corporations in their methods of operation
and power.21 Since labor unions have more of the characteristics of cor-
porate entities than of partnerships, it appears far more logical to treat
them as legal entities for purposes of tort liability than to apply rules of
partnerships.
20 Oil Workers International Union v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 2d 512, 230 P. 2d
71 (1951).
21 Ibid.
OBSCENITY-ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF
CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARDS
Two booksellers were convicted of violating the obscenity statute
of New York State.' A New York detective, representing himself as
a prospective customer, entered a bookstore managed by one of the
defendants. He observed two particular books on display, purchased said
books, and thereupon arrested the defendant for selling pornographic ma-
terial. Later in the same day the detective entered the store of the other
defendant and repeated the procedure, arresting this defendant also. At
the trial, the court applied the Roth test 2 to determine whether or not the
' See NEw YORK, PENAL LAW, S 1141 subd. 1, the relevant part of which provides;
"a person who sells .... or has in his possession with intent to sell .... any obscene ....
book... . is guilty of a misdemeanor."'
2 The test for obscenity was officially laid down to be: "whether to the average per-
son, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the ma-
terial taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 489 (1957).
